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Much of the current interest in medical ethics seems to focus on a few 
specific areas, notably the areas of human reproduction and organ 
transplantation. Although many other branches of medicine are occupied 
with the task of healing, preventing illness and prolonging life, these two 
areas seem to capture the imagination of many as concrete examples of 
medicine pushing back the frontiers of science-fiction, and opening up all 
kinds of new possibilities. They purport to offer us the possibility of 
creating new human beings, and of providing replacement parts for those 
who are already in existence. Development in these areas of medicine 
seems to take place at a phenomenal rate, in a way which is scientifically 
exciting and which, from a human point of view, gives rise to a mixture of 
hope and apprehension. 
Medicine is in a very interesting and sensitive position, delicately 
balanced as it is between the natural sciences and the human sciences. It 
has to answer questions which relate to both - questions about what is 
possible and about what is appropriate, about "can" and "should". Is it 
possible to take human gametes, to develop an embryo and to transplant it 
successfully into the womb, and is it appropriate? Can I successfully graft a 
portion of brain tissue from one person, into the brain of another; should 
I? Indeed, one aspect of decision-making in medical ethics, which tends to 
add considerably to the confusion, and to render many ethical decisions 
suspect, is when the acceptability of a procedure is made to follow from the 
fact that it is possible to carry it out "successfully", rather than from any 
consideration of what is actually involved in human terms. 
Personhood, then, is a key question for medical ethics. If we are to have 
any possibility of dealing with the ethical questions which are posed by 
human fertilization in-vitro, organ transplants, and many of the other 
developments of modern medicine, we need to be able to answer the 
question about what is in the test-tube or on the operating table. We need 
to be able to recognize what is a person from what is not. We need to have 
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reliable criteria for determining when a person begins to be and when one 
ceases to be present. 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the concept of "person" as it has 
developed since its origins as a theological term in the early centuries of the 
Christian era. [t will become clear that ongoing development is not a denial 
of completeness as a person, either in philosophical or biological terms. 
The relationship between personhood and the right to life will be discussed 
in the context of in-vitro fertilization and the use of embryos. 
Boethius and Aquinas 
The first systematic definition of "person" is the definition of Boethius: 
"Person is an individual substance of rational nature." This definition is 
the subject of discussion by Aquinas in the first book of the Summa 
Theologica (Aquinas, 1964/ 6, lae. , 29). It is a definition which Aquinas 
broadly accepts, with one particular reservation. The term "substance", as 
earlier generations of philosophers had also noticed, is ambiguous. 
Sometimes it is used in a way which means simply "essence". At other 
times it is used in a way which is synonymous with "hypostasis" or 
"subsistens", implying an actual reality and not just an essence. What is at 
the heart of the problem here is whether Boethius uses the term 
"substance'.' in the sense of something which actually exists, or only in the 
sense of the concept. It is possible to have a concept of "doctor" (let us call 
it "doctorhood") but the concept is not the reality. Doctorhood cannot 
perform surgery, or write a prescription. To do these things , we need to 
have an actually existing doctor. 
Aquinas's objection, then, is not that Boethius's definition is wrong, but 
that it is open to misinterpretation. Because of his use of the word 
"substance", it is not sufficiently clear whether he considers "person" to be 
a reality, existing in its own right, or just a concept. 
In his earlier works (e.g. Summa Contra Gentiles and the first part of the 
Summa Theologica). Aquinas makes regular use of the term "subsistens" 
to express a distinct entity which stands firm by reason of its own separate 
existence. Separate existence is the characteristic of an entity which is 
complete in itself, and distinct from anything else. 
When we go on to the third part of the Summa Theologica we find 
Aquinas referring explictly to being (existence) as a constitutive element of 
a person. 
Both existence and activity belong to the person and derive from the nature. but 
in different ways . Existence is an element in the actual realisation of the person ; 
under this aspect. therefore. it is to be considered as the ultimate perfection. 
(Aquinas. 1964/ 6. 3ae. 19. I ad 4) . 
In the third part also he demonstrates an obvious preference for 
describing a person as a "subsistent in an intellectual nature", precisely 
beca use the term "subsistens" incorporates the notion of separate 
existence. By using the term "subsistens" in his definition of "person", 
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Aquinas is expressing his understanding that a person is a) an entity, and 
not just a concept; b) a whole and not just a part. 
The fresh insight which Aquinas brings to the question of personhood is 
his explanation that separate existence and intellectual nature (essence) 
together are constitut ive of persons. He also makes the important point 
that the activity of a person is not const itutive of the person, but rather 
consequent on its being a person (Aquinas , 1964( 6, 3ae, 19, I ad 4). In 
other words, I am not a person because of what I do, but rather I can do 
what I do because I am a person. 
In conclusion, then, for Aquinas , a person cannot be what lacks its own 
separate existence. On the ot her hand, a person can exist without 
necessarily performing all , or indeed, to be logically consistent, any of the 
activity appropriate to a rational nature. 
Alternatives to Realism: (1) Empiricism 
Aquinas's understanding of person is conditioned by the fact that he 
admits the possibility, indeed the reality, ofa world mediated by meaning, 
and not just the inner world of immediate experience. By immediate 
experience, I mean consciousness which has no reference to anyth ing 
outside the self. 
For Aquinas, experience leads to reflection and insight, and to 
judgments about the truth of reality. For Empiricists such as Locke and 
H ume, the only reality is that of immediate experience. H ume is convinced 
that there cannot be identifiable things because , in reality, everything is 
composed of success ive and closely related parts, and these on ly appear to 
our minds as if continuous. 
What will suffice to prove the hypothesis to the satisfaction of every fair enquirer 
is to show from daily experience and observation. that the objects which are 
variable or interrupted. and yet are supposed to continue the same. are such only 
as consist of a succession of parts. connected together by resemblance. contiguity 
or causation. (Hume. 1888. p. 255) . 
Such a view of the world, of necessity, conditions the empiricists' 
understanding of what a person is. If there is only the appearance of unity 
and identity about things in general, and they do not actua lly exist as 
concrete entities outside the consciousness of the observer , then the same 
must be true of the "Self'. Continuity as a Self, or personal identity, is 
dependent on continuous self-consciousness. Locke would describe a 
person as "a thinking intelligent being that has reason and reflection and 
can consider itself, as itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and 
places." (Locke, 1975, 11, 9,28). 
H ume takes Locke's idea one step further in that he chooses to recognize 
"person" as "just a train of consciousness" and sees even the unity of 
consciousness as purely circumstantial. 
40 
For my part. when I enter most intimately into what I call myself. I always 
stumble on some perception or other. of heat or cold, light or shade, love or 
hatred , pain or pleasure. I can never catch myselFat any time without a perception 
and never ca n observe anything but the perception. When my perceptions are 
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removed for any time, as by sound sleep; so long am I insensible of myself and 
may truly be said not to exist" . (Hume, 1888, p. 252). 
The legacy of the empiricists is to be found, alive if not well, in the 
writings of people such as Peter Singer, Michael Tooley and John Harris, 
on such topics as the treatment of the handicapped newborn. Each of these 
writers defines personhood in terms of the immediate experience of a 
person as consciously self-aware, as having desires and interests. What 
they are in effect saying is that we can only experience ourselves and others 
as persons by the actual exercise of rationality , and that beyond that 
experience, we have no grounds for asserting the existence of a person . 
Singer, an Australian philosopher teaching at Monash University, 
concludes: 
When I think of myself as the person I now am, I realise that I did not come into 
existence until sometime after my birth. At birth I had no sense of the future , and 
no experiences which I can now remember as mine. It is the beginning of the life of 
the person , rather than of the physical organism, that is crucial so far as the right 
to life is concerned. (Singer, and Kuhse, 1985, p. 133). 
The failure of the approach of Locke and Hume, and more recently of the 
school of thought represented by Singer, Harris and Tooley is that, in 
basing personhood on the ability to desire, to have a continuous 
consciousness, to achieve a certain distinctly human level of performance, 
they overlook the fact that all this presupposes a being who desires, is 
conscious and performs at such a level. They place considerable stress on 
the actuation of an aspect of the human essence and fail to take account of 
its continuous existence as a distinct human entity. 
Hume denied personal identity because he experienced change, but the 
concept of identity is meaningless without the possibility of change. To 
express this in another way, it is only in the midst of change that we can 
relevantly attribute any significance to what remains the same. If we 
translate Hume's problem into the modern idiom and the modern context, 
we find that what Singer et at. have done is to confuse the concept of 
"personality", something which is variable and non-essential, with the 
concept of "person" which is invariable and essential. To exercise 
personality one must first be a person . 
(2) Utilitarianism 
We have seen already that there is a close correlation between the 
recognition of a person and the acceptance of personal rights, such as the 
right to life and to medical treatment. While realists and empiricists differ 
as to the criteria which are appropriate for recognizing a person, both 
viewpoints do have their criteria, and in each case, what ought to be done is 
based initially on a judgment of fact about personhood. There is a direct 
link between what something Is and how it ought to be treated. 
Utilitarians are not prepared to allow that rights are based on objective 
criteria, and this has implications for the way in which they deal with the 
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question of personhood. The basis of Utilitarianism is to be found in the 
idea that what is good consists in the creation of happiness and the 
avoidance of unhappiness. John Stuart Mill , probably the best known 
exponent of Utilitarianism, concedes that there is a scale of human 
pleasures and happiness. such that not all pleasures are eq ually valuable or 
desirable. Mill maintains that Justice is a central element of the Utilitarian 
code, but admits that Justice is liable to be a subjective concept in that it 
involves both a rule of cond uct and a sentiment of justice. The sentiment of 
justice in his understanding is 
the animal desire to repel or retaliate a hurt or damage to oneself. or to those with 
whom one sympathises. widened so as to include all persons by the human 
capacity of enlarged sympathy and the human conception of intellgent self-
interest (Mill. J. S .. 1962. p. J08). 
Mill uses the example of the debate about the morality of slavery to 
illustrate how moral decision-making tends to be influenced to a 
considerable extent by what is expedient, rather than by objective criteria. 
He takes this as sufficient evidence to demonstrate that expediency or the 
principle of utlity is a kind of law of nature. 
Even in slave countries it is theoretically admitted that the rights of a slave. such 
as they are. ought to be as sacred as those of the master; and that a tribunal which 
fails to enforce them with equal strictness is wanting injustice: while at the same 
time. institutions which leave to the slave scarcely any rights to enforce are not 
deemed unjust. because they are not deemed inexpedient. Those who think that 
utility requires distinctions of rank. do not think it unjust that riches and social 
privileges should be unequally dispensed: but those who think this inequality 
inexpedient. think it unjust also. (Mill. 1962. p. JOI) 
To the extent that the sentiment of justice is based on expediency, it is 
certain to be subjective and partial, and not a reliable indication of what is 
truly just or good universally. Just as any decision about the rights of a 
slave, according to this view, will depend on how useful slavery is perceived 
to be in any given society; so the rights of an embryo or a neonate would 
depend on what view society had of their usefulness (e.g., for the 
preservation of the species, or for research). However Mill presents it, the 
Utilitarian view of rights depends on a subjective balancing of the pleasure 
of one person or group and another. The criterion is one of expediency and 
the question of personhood doesn't enter into it. 
We are all familiar with the classic examples of expediency (the Eskimo 
grandfather left to die on the ice, the passengers thrown out of the lifeboat 
so that it will continue to fioat, etc.). The reality of Utilitarianism in the 
modern context is to be found, for example, in the report of the Warnock 
Committee on Human Embryology. Mary Warnock, who chaired this 
British Government committee, expresses in one of her papers unease at 
the idea that the life or death of a child should be decided simply on the 
basis of the parents' attitude. Yet she says that nothing is settled by our 
deciding to call a newborn infant or an embryo a "person". 
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The question 'Is he a person?' is in effect only another way of asking 'May I or may 
I not do what I like with him?' It is agreed that the appropriateness or otherwise of 
the word 'person' is a matter of decision. Would it not be less confusing therefore 
to go straight to the main decision , namely the decision how we ought to treat 
him? (Warnock, M. , 1983, p. 240). 
What Warnock seems not to take into account is the fact that when we 
prescind from the question whether the infant or the embryo is or is not a 
person, we are left with no option but to make the decision about rights or 
about treatment depend on the preference of some other party. Without 
the question about personhood , the objective basis for any decision is 
removed . 
So , while the empiricists narrow their consideration about personhood 
to one aspect of the essence of a person, and ignore the continuity of 
existence; the Utilitarians , ignoring any objective consideration of human 
existence or essence , make personhood a non-question and , in so doing for 
all practical purposes decree that no one is to be considered a person 
except for reasons of expediency. 
Lonergan: Person as Dynamic Being 
The attempt to deal with moral questions without some kind of 
objective base is doomed to failure. We have seen that any attempt to 
bypass the person or to see the person purely in terms of function or 
activity (essence) is inadequate. 
Bernard Lonergan, the distinguished theologian and philosopher who 
has taught at Harvard , in Rome and at Boston College , re-affirms the basic 
principle of realism, that all things (including persons) are constituted by 
both essence and existence. He makes a distinction between what we know 
by common sense through perception, and the underlying reality which we 
judge to be (exist) on the basis of our perceptions. The data which we 
perceive and even the concepts which we form are objects of experience, 
but cannot properly be called things. 
With an object of experience (e .g. , a landscape) the aggregate of data 
changes from time to time , but such change is possible only because there is 
some entity , underlying the data , in which the change takes place. This is 
what we mean by a thing, and Lonergan describes it as an "intelligible 
concrete unity". Bya process of elimination, he concludes that the basis for 
this unity is not to be found in accidents, principles , parts , potencies or 
essence. There is only one possible explanation for the transcendent unity 
which is the hallmark of a thing, and that is the having of its own separate 
existence. It is in a distinctly existing entity that accidents , principles , 
possibilities and essence are all brought together. (cf. Lonergan , I 964a, 
p.21). 
The principal fact worth noting at this stage is that a thing is strictly one, 
while at the same time , our sense experience reveals the possibility of 
change in things. It follows that being and change, far from being in 
conflict , are related. Being is a pre-condition for change. 
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While separate existence is the ultimate basis for recognizing a thing, the 
things which exist are seen to differ according to essence, and it is on this 
basis that we classify them according to species . A person is defined as a 
thing, the essence (or nature) of which is to be rational. The term has been 
classically used to refer to God , to angels, and to human beings. To be a 
thing involves completeness , distinctness and internal unity. But what 
exactly does it mean to be "of an intellectual nature"? 
Lonergan defines intellectual nature as "nature which can operate over 
the whole range of being by understanding and willing" (cf.; Lonergan, 
1964a, p. 24). The whole range of being includes the metaphysical; the 
transcendent. But it is precisely here that the empiricists and their heirs run 
into trouble. For them, a nature which can operate over the whole range of 
being by understanding and willing must be experienced as so acting in 
practice and , failing to experience this activity, they conclude that there is 
no person. 
Lonergan introduces an important distinction into the debate about 
being, and so into our understanding of personhood. This is the distinction 
between central act and potency, and conjugate act and potency. "Act" is a 
technical term which implies completion, while "potency" implies 
openness to change or development. Anything which exists is in central 
act , but it is invariably in potency to a further actuation (i.e. , conjugate 
potency and act) . The act of being is basic and prior to all other acts, but it 
is not isolated from potency to various other developments. To be 
complete is not the same as to be finished developing. 
Since one and the same thing is both perfectible and perfected. we have the 
fundamental theorem of metaphysical composition. namely. that the very same 
thing is in first potency by potency and in first act by form ; the same thing is in 
second potency by form and in second act by act ; and the very same thing is in 
potency by substance and in Act by its accidents (Lonergan . 1964a . p. 29). 
So, it can be said of all things, and of persons in particular that their 
essence or nature is a potency for any actuation beyond the act of being 
itself. While the potency is not the thing itself, a thing on the way to 
fulfillment is no less a thing simply because all its potential is not yet 
realized. Indeed , common sense tells us that no thing can realize all of its 
potential, because the actuation of some of that potential might, In 
practice, preclude the actuation of some other. 
Insofar as persons are concerned, intellectual activity is second or 
conjugate act , while an intellectual nature is the potency for this act. 
Intellectual activity therefore is not the nature of a person, but only an 
expression of that nature. No human intellect can know everything 
perfectly. No human potential is ever fully realized , and therefore lack of 
perfection, far from being an indication of inhumanity or sub-humanity is , 
in fact, a characteristic of being human. 
44 
The human intellect, then . is only mere potency in the genus of the intelligible; in 
the beginning it is comparable with a 'tabula rasa' and subsequent ly. having 
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taken in something it knows nothing in act except phantasms. (Lonergan, 1964b, 
p.226). 
Since being is a pre-condition for change, and both things and, 
specifically , persons , while centrally in act have a potency to further or 
conjugate act , it follows that to be is not necessarily to be slatic. This 
metaphysical insight of considerable importance seems to hearken back to 
the comment of Heraclitus , the pre-Christian Greek philosopher, that the 
universe is in a state of flux. Perhaps in attempting to express the centrality 
to "being" of unity and continuity, the scholastic concept of "being" 
conveyed too great a sense of rigidity and inability to change. But for 
Lonergan , 
Finality is the d ynamic as pec t of the real. To affirm finality is to affirm 
movement , fluidit y, tension, app roximat iveness , inco mpleteness (Lonergan. 
1958. p. 446). 
and finality, 
is no less the sad ness offai lu re than the joy o f success. It is to be di sce rned no less 
in false sta rt s and in breakdowns than in sta bility a nd progress. It is as much the 
meaning of aberration and co rrupti o n and decline. as is sanity and honesty a nd 
development (Lonergan . 1958. p. 448). 
So the la w of being is one of immanent finality - a process of becoming 
more completely what one already is , in response to an end which is written 
into one's essence, rather than exerted from without. An external finality is 
certain and inescapable, whereas an immanent finality opens up 
possi bilities and provides the means for their fulfillment. 
The Embryo as Person 
Biology and embryology cannot account for the coming to be of a 
person , because the reality of personhood goes beyond the limits of 
biology. However it is important to note that the concept of a "person" 
who is and is yet becoming. and who may never reach activity of a 
recognizably human kind, is not in conflict with the laws of biology. 
While life is cyclical, animal organisms are distinct and entire in 
themse lves and have an identifiable moment of origin. As an entity , 
genet ically related to but distinct from both its parents , the human embryo 
is complete by the time of the first mitotic divis ion. 
The parts of the plasmalemma of the spermatozoon and the egg. outside the zo ne 
of contact. fuse together in a conti nuo us sheet. The cytoplas mic contents of the 
two ga metes are now in direct continuity. Although the shape of the 
spermatozoon ma y yet be distinguishable . the two gametes at thi s stage have 
become one single ce ll (Ba linsky. 198 1, p. 112). 
If all the genetic information perta ining to the new organism were not 
contained in the first embryo nic cell, then it could not be replicated 
throughout the organism as it developed . The new organism is , in the 
Novem ber, 1989 45 
terminology of Lonergan, "a distinct subsistent". It is not a part of 
something else, nor is it just a collection of cells without any internal unity. 
But to be complete is not necessarily to be static . The human organism 
contains within itself a finality - a tendency to develop certain perfections 
which are in keeping with its nature. There is no way, however, of 
predicting all of the factors which may, at any subsequent stage, contribute 
to or interfere with the development of the organism. As Lonergan has 
reminded us above, finality is expressed in failure as well as in success. 
Apple trees bear fruit or do not bear fruit, they flourish or they die, they 
spread their branches to varying degrees , yet we never question the 
fundamental fact of what they are. 
It is not sufficient, of course, that the human organism subsists 
distinctly. It is that fact that it subsists precisely in an intellectual nature , 
which is a potency for all kinds of activity including knowing and willing, 
that is significant. This is what makes it possible for us to recognize the 
human embryo as a person from the time when it begins to exist as a new 
genetic and spiritual entity, until it ceases to be. 
Personhood as a Criterion for the Right to Life 
Many of the reasons which are presented for respecting the right to life 
of persons derive from the Judaeo-Christian tradition . The first chapter of 
the book of Genesis suggests that human beings , the final stroke of God's 
creative genius, made in His own image, are of special value. To be made in 
God's image has nothing to do with appearance or ]Jerformance, but 
implies the potential for relationship with God . The birth of Jesus Christ 
and His human life establishes a new intimacy and a permanence in God's 
relationship with the human race. For those of us who are Christian, these 
reasons are perfectly valid for recognition of the right to life of all persons, 
because they form part of what we believe, and our ethical judgments must 
be based on what we believe. 
"The Vatican Instruction on Human Life in Its Origins" expresses the 
Church's understanding of personhood as a criterion for the right to life , as 
follows: 
From the moment of conception. the life of every human being is to be respected 
in an absolute way, because man is the only creature on earth that God has 
'wis hed for himself and the spi ritual soul of each man is ' immediately created' by 
God; his whole being bears the image of the creator. Human life is sacred because, 
from its beginning it involves the 'c reati ve action of God' and it remains forever in 
a special relationship with the Creator, who is its sole end . (Congregation for the 
Doctrine of the Faith. 1987. p. II). 
But , even outside the context of Christian or other religious belief, 
personhood is no less significant as a criterion for the right to life . The fact 
that personhood can be attributed in the same measure to an embryo, to a 
neonate, to a mature adult and to a geriatric patient, does not mean that 
they are all "the same", but it does mean that there is no basis in reality for 
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distinguishing between them insofar as the right to life is concerned . 
Persons are defined in terms of what they are. not in terms of how fully 
they have actuated their potential. A person. by definition. is being-for-
a nd-i n-itself. irrespective of what or even whether someone else wants it to 
be. In simple terms. what it is determines how it ought to be treated. The 
righllO life either applies lO all persons or it does not apply to any of them . 
One person cannot decide that the life of another is disposable. without 
logically deciding the same about his own. 
An Application: In- Vitro Fertilization 
In-vitro fertilization as a process for bypassing human infertility. 
involves the aspiration of mature oocytes (eggs) in large quantities from 
the mother-to-be. and their fertilization with treated sperm provided by 
the male. This fertilization takes place in a dish (the "test-tube") and the 
embryos thus produced are "grown on" in the dish and monitored for a few 
days. after which some or all are transferred to the mother's uterus. Those 
which remain, if any. may be frozen and stored for further attempts during 
a later cycle. used for research purposes. or disposed of. 
Since embryos actually subsist . and are of an intellectual nature. it is 
appropriate that we ask, "What are the implications of IVF for these 
persons?" 
a. Multiple transfers: . 
The practice of using two or three embryos on anyone occasion is 
designed to increase the possibility of pregnancy. It has. however. been 
shown to reduce the chances of survival of each individ ual embryo. (cf. 
Luno and Mondejar. 1986. p. 48) . Thus the acceptance of this practice 
involves the implication that it is expedient that a person or persons 
should die so that others may be parents. It places the right to 
parenthood above the right to life. ' 
I, 
b . Freeze-storage: 
This process has been shown greatly to reduce the chances of survival 
of the individ ual em bryo. (cf.. Senate Select Com mittee. 1986. p. 129). 
It does provide more chances of pregnancy without the need to 
multiply the number of laparoscopies. As in the case of a. (above) it 
implies that human convenience is the primary consideration. It could 
be said that the embryo becomes the ultimate in frozen consumer 
products. 
I 
The Vatican Instruction, referred to above. states that: 
The free7ing of embryos. even when carried out in order to preserve the life 
of an embryo - cryopreservation - constitutes an offence against the 
respect due to human beings by exposing them to grave risks of death or 
harm to their physical integrity and depriving them. at least temporarily. of 
maternal shelter and gestation. thus placing them in a situation in which 
further offences and manipulation are possible. (Congregation for the 
Doctrine of the Faith. 1987. p. 19) 
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c. Research: 
Under present conditions, research on human embryos is inevitably 
destructive. It is undeniable that much valuable knowledge about 
genetic disorders can be achieved by means of this research , but only at 
the expense of the individ ual embryo, on whom the research is carried 
out. The Declaration of Helsinki makes a distinction between 
biomedical research which may be of benefit to the patient / subject and 
research which is non-therapeutic. It states that 
In research on man the interests of science and society should never take 
precedence over considerations related to the well-being of the subject. 
(Declarat ion of Helsinki , 1975, 111 , 4) 
The Warnock committee approves even the production of embryos 
specifically for research (Warnock, 1985, p. 69), while the Australian 
Senate Committee, in line with the Helsinki Declaration, rejects 
experimentation on an embryo which is "invasive and destructive of 
that embryo". (Senate Select Committee, 1986, p. 16). It is significant 
that, although the Australian Senate Select Committee approves in-
vitro fertilization, its rejection of any form of experimentation on 
embryos is based firmly on a particular understanding of the nature of 
the embryo. 
If, as is the view of the committee, the embryo may be described as 
genetically new human life, organised as a distinct entity oriented towards 
further development , then the stance and behaviour proper to adopt 
towards it would include not frustrating a process which commands respect , 
because its thrust is towards the further development of a biologically 
individuated member of the human species. (Senate Select Committee, 1986, 
p.25). 
Unfortunately, this very positive view of the embryo, held by the 
Select Committee, does not lead the Committee to reject other 
procedures which frustrate the healthy development of the embryo, 
e.g., frozen storage and disposal. 
Oliver O'Donovan, an Angelican priest / philosopher, points out 
that it is not really possible to condemn research on embryos and yet 
accept IYF because, irrespective of where and when the research took 
place, it was and remains a necessary pre-condition of the success of 
IYF. "Our view of IYF", he concludes, "is necessarily determined by 
our view of non-clinical research on early embryos" (O'Donovan, 
1984, p. 80). 
The implication of research on embryos is that a person can be a 
means to an end. Here value is to be found in what I can achieve 
through her use, not in what she is or can be in herself. This is a 
common enough pre-supposition also in relation to born persons (e .g., 
in attitudes towards labor, economic policy, and military strategy). 
d . Disposal: 
Som embryos are disposed of because they are not needed, others are 
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rejected because they are seen to fall short of the required standard. In 
either case , the human significance of the disposal of embryos is that 
persons are of no intrinsic value. It is not uncommon to meet adult 
prod ucts of the same attitude - people who are left to one side because 
they are surplus to requirements, or because they don't measure up. 
e. Re-implantation: 
The "lucky" embryos are those which are successfully transferred , 
anything between 2% and 10%. But even in success there are important 
human implications. The question has been raised, not unreasonably, 
as to how an embryo who is manufactured by a process of modern 
technology, rather than begotten of a loving embrace, can be 
understood as being-for-and-in-itself. This is not to suggest that 
parents of IYF children love their children any less than other parents, 
but is simply a reflection of how intrusive technology can be. The 
parent who lives out his own dreams and ambitions in his child is a 
well-known stereotype. Could IYF represent the ultimate in 
being-for-another? 
Conclusion: 
In conclusion, in-vitro fertilization , of its very nature, has depended and 
will continue to depend on embryo research which is invasive and 
destructive . The conditions and assumptions which offer the greatest 
possibility of successful in-vitro fertilization are those which require that 
the embryo be regarded as disposable, and of no value in itself. 
Medicine is directed toward the well-being of persons , through the 
prevention and healing of sickness and disease, the alleviation of pain, and 
the care of those who are suffering. In-vitro fertilization does not fall into 
any of these categories, and is found to be implicitly and explicitly in 
conflict with the respect due to the embryo as person. It cannot, therefore, 
be considered to be ethical. 
"In-vitro" fertilization is but one of many aspects of medical practice 
and biotechnology about which an appropriate ethical judgment can be 
made only in the light of an adequate concept of "person". Others would 
include pre-natal diagnosis , our treatment of handicapped newborn, 
geriatric, psychiatric and comatose patients, as well as decisions about 
resuscitation after cardiac arrest. Attempts to make suchjudgments, while 
bypassing the judgment about personhood , or while confusing "person" 
with "personality", lead only to failure and confusion. 
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